

NINE SECOND-ORDER NATIONAL ELECTIONS – A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN ELECTION RESULTS

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European Elections Study

ABSTRACT

The composition of the directly elected European Parliament does not precisely reflect the “real” balance of political forces in the European Community. As long as the national political systems decide most of what there is to be decided politically, and everything really important, European elections are additional national second-order elections. They are determined more by the domestic political cleavages than by alternatives originating in the EC, but in a different way than if nine first-order national elections took place simultaneously. This is the case because European elections occur at different stages of the national political systems’ respective “electoral cycles”. Such a relationship between a second-order arena and the chief arena of a political system is not at all unusual. What is new here, is that one second-order political arena is related to nine different first-order arenas. A first analysis of European election results satisfactorily justifies the assumption that European Parliament direct elections should be treated as nine simultaneous national second-order elections.

1. Introduction: In Search of “The” Result

In the case of the first direct elections to the European Parliament, the possibilities of finding different results from the same election increase in number. One can look at seats or at votes cast. One can indicate the biggest party as winner or the party which has enjoyed the largest increase in share of votes. With European elections one can tabulate political parties EC-wide or nationally.

In parliamentary elections we are accustomed to begin with an

A list of abbreviations used throughout this article can be found on page 159.

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TABLE I

Percentage of Votes and Seats by European Political Group or Tendency

	Valid votes			Seats		
	% EE	% NE	Difference	% new EP	% former EP	Difference
Far Left	1.2	1.2	±0.0	0.5	0.0	+0.5
Communists	13.5	11.5	+2.0	10.7	9.1	+1.6
USE	26.6	29.7	-3.1	27.5	33.8	-6.3
ELD	10.5	11.1	-0.6	9.8	11.6	-1.8
EPP	29.6	25.4	+4.2	25.9	26.3	-0.4
ED	6.2	9.2	-3.0	15.4	9.1	+6.3
EDP	3.7	5.1	-1.4	5.4	8.6	-3.2
Ecologists	3.0	1.3	+1.7	0.7	0.0	+0.7
Regional Parties	1.2	1.2	±0.0	1.2	1.0	+0.2
Others	4.5	4.1	+0.4	2.7	1.0	+1.6

Source: Table AI, pp. 146-7, this issue.

evaluation of the *number of seats* obtained by the various parties and a comparison of these results with those in the previous Parliament. Proceeding in this way for the "European elections," one finds that the winners were, above all, the Conservatives (European Democrats), securing a 6.3% increase in the number of their seats. Also enjoying an increase were the Communists, Ecologists, extreme Left and regional parties (see Table I). Chief among the losers, on the other hand, were the Socialists, who suffered a setback of 6.3% of seats in the new Parliament. They were followed in this respect by the Progressive Democrats, Liberals, and Christian Democrats (European People's Party). The Socialist parliamentary group remained, nevertheless, the largest in the European Parliament. After the Socialists came the Christian Democrats, the Conservatives and the Communists, in that order.

TABLE II

The Largest Single Parties in the European Parliament

Party	Number of seats
Con (ED, GB)	60
SPD (USE, D)	35
CDU (EPP, D)	34
DC (EPP, I)	29
PCI (COM, I)	24
PS (USE, F)	22
PCF (COM, F)	19
Lab (USE, GB)	17

The Liberals fell from third to fifth place, while the Progressive Democrats remained at sixth. A further parliamentary group – albeit of a rather “formal” nature – was constituted by a number of MEP’s in order to enjoy the technical advantages of belonging to such a group. A total of 2.7% of MEP’s remained outside parliamentary groupings.

Examining votes cast, a striking feature is the *low turnout*. If one looks at party distribution of votes cast, the Christian-Democratic European People’s Party received the greatest share of votes, with 29.6% (an increase of 4.2%), followed by the Socialists with 26.6% (down from 29.7%). The Communists enjoyed the greatest growth in proportion of votes. Also increasing their share were the Ecologists (1.7%). The percentage obtained by the extreme Left and by regional parties remained unchanged. The most serious losses were incurred by the Socialists (–3.1%) and the Conservatives (–3.0%); voting figures for the Progressive Democrats and Liberals also show decreases (–1.7% and –0.6, respectively).

These calculations are not without problems, for there are no directly comparable figures for a previous set of European elections. The figures cited above compare the percentage obtained in these first elections to the European Parliament to those for the most recent respective national elections, tabulated on an EC-wide basis. On the basis of these percentages the putative “electoral defeat of the Left” appears less a collective set-back (a decrease of 1.1% in *share of votes*) than a shifting from the Socialists to the Communists and splinter-parties which could not reflect their popular support in seats in the European Parliament. The Socialists, extreme Left, and Communists, taken together, suffered a loss of 4.2% in *number of seats*. An overall summary of results is presented in Table AI (pp. 146-7, this issue).

Most observers devote less attention to these shifts in popular vote and parliamentary seats tabulated across the EC than to shifts between parties at the national level. Here too comparisons are made with the latest national parliamentary elections. (For a summary of results in terms of nations and party groups, see Table AII; in Tables AIII to A XII the share of popular vote for each individual party is given [pp. 150-3].)

Table III provides a detailed picture as to the relative increase or decrease of the various national political parties. While the category of those showing the greatest increase is highly variegated, among those with the largest decrease are all the Progressive Democrats and many Socialist parties.

Due to the across-the-board lower level of electoral participation, of particular interest are those twenty political parties which show an

TABLE III

Relative Winners and Losers (Percent European Elections Minus Percent National Elections)

Winners		Losers	
1. DUUP (NIRL)	+19.6	FF (EDP, IRL)	-15.9
2. Fb (DK)	+17.6	SD (USE, DK)	-15.1
3. Indep. (IRL)	+8.7	OUUP (NIRL)	-14.7
4. PD (ELD, L)	+6.8	FRP (EDP, DK)	-8.8
5. UDF (F)	+6.1	RPR (EDP, F)	-6.3
6. KF (ED, DK)	+5.5	Lab (USE, GB)	-5.3
7. SDLP (USE, NIRL)	+5.0	PS (USE, BW)	-4.9
8. Con (ED, GB)	+4.5	PSC (EPP, BW)	-3.9
9. CVP (EPP, BF)	+4.3	PvdA (USE, NL)	-3.4
10. CDA (EPP, NL)	+3.7	POSL (USE, L)	-2.6
11. D'66 (NL)	+3.6	PVV (EDL, BF)	-2.0
12. Pl. Cymru (GBW)	+3.6	VU (reg., BF)	-2.0
13. Ecol (ecol., BW)	+3.6	FDP (ELD, D)	-1.9
14. Grüne (ecol., D)	+3.2	DC (EPP, I)	-1.8
15. PRL (ELD, BW)	+3.0	SPD (USE, D)	-1.8
16. Labour (USE, IRL)	+2.9	KFP (DK)	-1.6
17. FG (EPP, IRL)	+2.6	VVD (ELD, NL)	-1.5
18. V (ELD, DK)	+2.5	Lib (ELD, GB)	-1.2
19. CSU (EPP, DB)	+2.5	PS/MRG (USE, F)	-1.2
20. FDF/RW (reg., BW)	+2.2	PCI (COM, I)	-0.8
21. Ecol (ecol., F)	+2.2	KPB (COM, BF)	-0.8
22. SNP (EDP, GBS)	+2.1	PRI (ELD, I)	-0.4
23. Agalev (ecol, BF)	+2.0	RV (DK)	-0.3
24. JJSS (F)	+1.8	CD (ED, DK)	-0.2
25. PLI (ELD, I)	+1.7	PCF (COM, F)	-0.1

increase in the absolute number of votes obtained (see Table IV). Striking here is the fact that most of these are very small and relatively new parties. Nine receive less than 5% of the votes in those areas in which they placed candidates (eight stood for election in only one district); six received no seat in the European Parliament. Five of these "absolute" winners belong to the Confederation of Socialist Parties, while two others belong to the ELD, one to the EPP, and four to the Ecologists.

These party-specific results become even more meaningful in the political contexts of the various nations. Considered in this light, there are fully *nine different* results of the European elections (or eleven, including Northern Ireland and Greenland; twelve, including West Berlin; thirteen, dividing Belgium).

In the case of Italy and Great Britain the results show a strengthened gain for those parties which increased their support in national parliamentary elections held shortly prior to the European elections. An

TABLE IV

Absolute Winners. All Parties which Gained in Absolute Number of Votes, as compared with the Last National Legislative Elections. (All Countries except Luxembourg; figures are Percent of Last National Result.)

Die Grünen	(ecol., D)	max.
UV	(reg., I)	497
Ecologists	(ecol., B)	429
Fb	(anti-EC, DK)	321
DUP	(NIRL)	240
Independents	(IRL)	214
PLI	(ELD, I)	179
SF	(IRL)	162
Ecologists	(ecol., F)	145
PSP	(extr. Left, NL)	125
PRL	(ELD, B)	113
D'66	(left lib., NL)	113
CVP	(EPP, B)	111
PSI	(USE, I)	108
PSDI	(USE, I)	108
FDF/RW	(reg., B)	106
Labour	(USE, IRL)	104
SDLP	(USE, NIRL)	103
BSP	(USE, B)	102
PR	(ecol., I)	102

embarrassing setback was suffered by the government in the Republic of Ireland. Less drastic, but still not without significance in terms of possible governmental change, was the loss suffered by the ruling coalition in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the Netherlands the affirmation of the ruling CDA contrasted with the disappointment met with by the challenging PvdA. The Communists and the UDF managed to improve their starting position for the 1981 presidential elections in France, as they were able to halt the momentum of growth for the Socialists and to inflict a substantial defeat on the Gaullists.

Conflicting results for regionally corresponding parties in the Flemish and Wallonian areas of Belgium meant an even stronger emphasis upon the personal victory of Leo Tindemans, former Minister-President and the Chairman of the European People's Party. Similarly impressive was the victory of Reverend Ian Paisley in Northern Ireland — a victory which spells a decline in “moderate” influence and greater difficulty in reaching peace in the province.

In the national elections held in Luxembourg on the same day as the European elections, the decline of Socialist Party support led to the collapse of the coalition and the resignation of Minister-President Gaston Thorn, who also serves as President of the European Liberal Demo-

crats and of the Liberal International. His resignation appeared rather ironic, given the substantial victory of his Democratic Party, and the fact that this victory was largely attributed to his own popularity [1].

The European elections provided a repetition of the 1972 referendum in the case of Denmark. The success of the EC-supporters against the EC-opponents was undisputed; there was also a clear defeat for parties pragmatically ambivalent in their attitude towards EC-matters such as the Social Democrats and the Progressive Democrats of Mr. Glistrup.

Do these various sets of results allow one to generalize or to make systematic comparisons? We approach the results of the European elections in terms of a framework which has been developed from the notion of "second-order elections". This framework is sketched out in the following section. A discussion follows, in which the possibilities for empirical testing of our hypotheses are considered. In Section 5 we discuss the data and the existing electoral analyses, of which we make use. In Section 4 the various hypotheses of the second-order elections model is tested using these data – preliminary though they may be.

2. Second-Order Elections

The "European" elections are simultaneous national elections in each of the EC-member nations. Although these elections have no institutionally binding consequences on government or opposition policies at the national level, the crucial factor here is the existing political connection between European elections and the national political configuration – above all, the manner in which this connection is perceived by political parties. This connection exists and has an effect, regardless of whether or not it is explicitly expressed. It could be assumed, in fact, that it becomes particularly obvious in those cases in which its existence is denied [2].

Second-order elections are, of course, neither new nor unfamiliar either in the European Community or in Western democracies as a whole. In each of these systems one can discern with relative ease which are the decisive elections [3]: the "first-order" elections in parliamentary systems are the national parliamentary elections, and in presidential systems, the national presidential elections [4]. In addition to these, however, there is a plethora of "second-order" elections: by-elections, municipal elections, various sorts of regional elections, those to a "second chamber" and the like. The specific significance of these lies in the particular arena in which public positions are filled according to the

respective electoral outcomes. Side-effects of these outcomes are nevertheless felt in the main arena of each nation. Many voters cast their votes in these elections not only as a result of conditions obtaining within the specific context of the second-order arena, but also on the basis of factors in the main political arena of the nation. The strategy and tactics of political parties in second-order election campaigns are often influenced by political calculations concerning the main arena [5].

In the following, we develop a systematic framework for the analysis of second-order elections. Certain relevant results from research on local, regional, and secondary national elections can be combined [6] to produce a model from which to draw hypotheses that can then be tested in the context of the first European elections.

2.1. THE "LESS-AT-STAKE" DIMENSION

Perhaps the most important aspect of second-order elections is that there is less at stake. Certain consequences result immediately from this for an adequate understanding of electoral results at second-order elections.

Lower level of participation: Since less is at stake in secondary elections, fewer voters may consider them sufficiently important to cast ballots. This attributing of lesser significance to such elections may also be noted among top-level politicians, partly activists, and political journalists. A generally subdued campaign means that fewer voters may even learn that elections are being held.

Brighter prospects for small and new political parties: The large, electorally decisive parties may receive votes in first-order elections from voters whose actual preference lies with some small or new party. While the small party may well represent the voter's opinion more precisely, he may opt for the opportunity – when more is at stake – of supporting a large, established party, and thereby the general direction of his political views. This dimension is institutionalised in electoral systems with an absolute majority requirement and provision for a run-off (e.g. in France).

Higher percentage of invalidated ballots: Displeasure at the set of parties and/or candidates which is offered the voter in first-order elections may find expression here in more explicit ways: by invalid marking of the ballot.

Government parties lose: Electoral research has shown that the popularity of a national government and the political parties which constitute it increases shortly after the election, only to decline again there-

after. After reaching a minimum approximately at mid-term of the legislative period, this popularity increases once again as the election approaches, coming finally to reflect the true electoral prospects (Goodhart and Bhansali, 1970). As a result the national governing parties enjoy a comparative disadvantage, and opposition a comparative advantage, in elections held at mid-term (Tufte, 1975; Dinkel, 1977b). The causes for this are often sought in the relatively higher mobilization of opposition support. Some voters have become disappointed by specific policies of the government. Some, who generally support the government, vote for the opposition in secondary elections in order to apply pressure on the government (cf. Hirschman's (1970) concept of "voice") although not fundamentally changing their party allegiance.

Remembering this feature of second-order elections when looking at the European elections, one would expect national ruling parties to receive a smaller proportion of votes because of a differential and generally lower turnout. In cases where the European elections took place shortly after national elections, one would also anticipate an "over-confirmation" of the tendencies that characterise the national election results.

2.2. THE SPECIFIC-ARENA DIMENSION

We must not, however, conclude that national aspects alone shape the activities and decisions taken at second-order elections. Dinkel (1977b) found that such a model applied to 67 *Landtag* elections in West Germany explained 47% of the variance in their results. Of course, the politics and behaviour of political parties in the specific arena where second-order elections are held play some role. There is less at stake to be sure, but there is still something at stake, nevertheless. Local councils and mayors often make decisions in important matters, as do regional councils, *conseils généraux*, or *Landtage*. In some nations these elect the head of the regional government or administration. We must not forget either, that this crude model does not take into account the specific political and economic situation in the national arena at the moment.

Thus, another important aspect of second-order elections is the political and institutional circumstances of the respective political arena: parties, platforms, candidates, the policy-areas and positions of control that *are* at stake, and the like. These circumstances vary greatly, of course, from arena to arena, as well as from one country to the next. With respect to the relationship between first- and second-order political arenas of a system, the following questions are of particular relevance:

Are the same parties competing? (The less this is the case, the less easy is the attempt to assume intricate interconnections). Are the same parties in power? (In this case, we would assume that their loss is relatively lower.) Are the coalition patterns corresponding or different? (Coalition change in the main arena is often tested in second-order arenas!) Is the general political role of political parties fully accepted in the specific arena? (Acceptance of parties playing a crucial role is often lower in local politics, which then tends to be considered as "local administration").

If we apply the general facets of second-order arenas and of the elections held there to the case at the European Community level and in the various European Parliament elections, we must, first of all, keep two things in mind:

First, this arena – for the first elections – is a new and unfamiliar one for almost all actors (not only voters, but party activists [7], most candidates [8], many journalists [9] and so forth [10]). Therefore the significance, information-level and involvement is modest; participation, consequently, is also modest.

But if there is a public debate on advantages of such constitutional rearrangements, parties and candidates taking a clear stand in respect to the issue have a better chance than parties that remain ambiguous. Hence, where European integration, and EC-membership, generally, are controversial in European elections, parties divided and/or ambiguous over this issue are in a particularly bad position, as compared to (most of the time "multiple-issue") first-order elections, because of the referendum nature which European elections adopt under these circumstances.

Second, what distinguishes the European from all other second-order political arenas, is the fact that it transcends national borders. All other second-order political arenas are sub-national arenas, political and administrative sub-systems. "Europe" is different. Although clearly of second-order nature, the European Community links several national (first-order) political systems with each other. The legitimacy of political parties playing an active and important role in what traditionally has been the arena of diplomats thinking in terms of national, and not of partisan, interests, might be less. Consequently, the inclination to vote for parties could be less also – as at the other end of the continuum, in local elections, some prefer to vote for independent personalities instead of partisan candidates. (Cf. Bullpitt, 1967, for England and Reif and Niedermayer, 1978, for West Germany.) For movements, or parties, that have a strong identification with a particular sub-"national" region and/or culture, however,

“Europe” and European elections might provide a change for playing down the dominant role of central (“national”) government, thereby securing a comparatively higher mobilization of their voters.

A third aspect of the European Community as an arena of second-order elections is the fact that the representative body which is elected has very little real power, even compared to other second-order elective bodies. Thus even less is at stake. All the arguments of our “less-at-stake”-dimension above are all the more relevant, because no institution that assumes the role of political leadership of the European Community is at stake in EP-elections.

A fourth aspect, however, of the European electoral arena is the complicated system of coalitions and party alliances at the EG-level. In order to make sure to be “in,” if – by accident – “real” power became at stake at the European level, national political parties not only have engaged themselves in running for seats in the EP [11] but also in transnational party-federation building. This is the most salient “coalition” aspect of European elections. By associating with ideologically similar parties from foreign countries, national parties might render their national party-identity diffuse, because their allies – in spite of common ideological principles and symbols – pursue different policies and form different national coalitions. This could decrease the share of their own country’s votes. Small parties, however, associated with powerful and strong federations might draw particular advantages from such alliances. (Cf. Reif, 1976). But does the size argument not also hold true the other way round?

2.3. THE INSTITUTIONAL-PROCEDURAL DIMENSION

The institutional and procedural settings of national first- and second-order political arenas are often quite different from each other. When we interpret political interaction between the respective elections, we must therefore proceed with caution. In particular, the various aspects of electoral procedure must be taken into account, before we try to assess political parallels and divergences.

The turnout, for instance, depends of course upon whether voting is required by law or not, and whether sanctions for not voting are severe. Bearing in mind the different, and already mentioned, reasons predicting an overall low turnout, this specification appears particularly important.

As electoral procedure regulations for the European elections were determined by national legislators, and most have retained the main features of the system used nationally, the impact of procedural differ-

ences may be expected to be low. Nevertheless we assume: the more distinct the electoral procedures were, as compared to the national tradition, the lower the turnout.

Of course, the change of electoral system in France from two-ballot-majority system to PR would favour small parties and liberate all parties from the negative aspects of being forced into electoral alliances. The five percent hurdle, however, counteracts this, thus reserving the advantages of PR to big parties. The problems of reaching the quorum threshold is much more severe for small parties in the small member-states and consequently discourages small parties in these countries, or, at least, puts pressure upon them to form alliances.

Also regionalisation and personalisation of PR by dividing the country into several constituencies and by permitting preference voting could increase turnout. If, however, these constituencies are new and unfamiliar to voters and party workers, and therefore bear little meaning for them, one must fear relatively lower turnout, because political actors will have difficulties in identifying with these territorial entities, perceived as artificial. This holds for the first-past-the-post system as well.

If European elections are held the same day as other national elections (e.g. local, regional, legislative) turnout is expected to be higher, even if differential abstention of those who do vote cannot be excluded. From the popularity-curve argument it also follows that the second-order election disadvantages of national governmental parties are less the nearer in time first-order elections are, because the "test-election" aspect is more obvious for many. Thus governments, able to control the national parliament election day might shy away from having test elections shortly before first-order elections if they are afraid of losing their majority. They will prefer to have European elections either the same day or thereafter.

2.4. THE CAMPAIGN DIMENSION

Campaign efforts of parties and candidates are more important at second-order elections than at first-order elections. In the latter, there is generally more attention given by the public (media as well as voters), because the entire political life of the country is naturally focused on this event. In second-order election campaigns, those campaigning must compete with other political issues and events in a situation in which voters are already less prepared to accept "campaign news" as important and relevant.

Thus parties commanding a fully developed organisational apparatus

and/or the required amounts of money needed to attract voters' attention are much better off if they are willing and capable of mobilising these resources. If those party elites responsible for party activity in the particular political arena where second-order elections are held succeed in mobilising top leaders as well as middle-level elites holding public and party positions in other sub-systems (territorial or functional), their chances of mobilising voters directly, as well as via the mass media, would be better.

On the other hand, if a party, from its analysis of prospective propensities of the electorate, concludes that its chances of winning a relatively high share of votes in a low turnout situation are good (because the rival party's electorate is split and/or undecided over the specific arena-related issues), then this party will not put so much effort into the campaign, in order not to provoke the competitor to "generalise" the campaign in the sense of introducing main-arena issues into the campaign of second-order elections.

To summarize the particular aspect of mass media relevance in second-order elections, we could say: the more national media are oriented towards first-order arena issues and sources of information, the more their contribution to the electoral mobilisation depends upon the attention first-order politicians pay to the specific second-order elections.

2.5. THE MAIN-ARENA POLITICAL CHANGE DIMENSION

The less-at-stake dimension does not take into account change of party preference distribution which is "real" (i.e. not popularity-curve based). If we want to explain European or any other second-order election results, this change must be taken into account. If one is more interested in the degree and direction than in the causes of this change, a rough estimate may be made on the basis of the change registered between the two first-order elections. Consequently, such an analysis of all European elections results cannot take place before the last member-state has held its first-order election following the European elections.

For a better evaluation of the relationship between first- and second-order elections (results), and of the variation of this relationship with different sorts of second-order elections in different countries, integrated data-files for all EC-countries should be available, containing the results of all second-order elections, and the respective first-order elections [12].

These real prospects may vary due to political change, induced by economic or "purely political" developments.

2.6. THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE DIMENSION

If we want to explain second-order election results we must finally take into account a dimension that is common to all elections, be they first- or second-order. This is the structural and cultural change dimension. Change in the social structure or in the cultural pattern of a country is largely independent of electoral results, of single elections in any case and, therefore, a factor potentially determining the outcome of elections, first-order elections as well as second-order elections. Since political parties are very often based on socio-economic or cultural groups, change in these patterns changes the pattern of party support in the electorate, if parties do not want or do not succeed in adapting themselves to new circumstances.

This dimension applies to the decrease of farmers and parties with major or exclusive support from farmers, the diminution of the number of blue collar workers and some workers' parties, the process of secularisation leading to shrinking electorates of religious parties, the growing ecological imbalances inducing the creation and success of ecologist parties, the growth of regional or cultural identification in plurinational states and the respective growth of regionalist and other minority parties.

3. Relating the Hypotheses?

We have attempted above to sketch out a series of bivariate formulated hypotheses. One must naturally assume that the factors discussed here exert some putative influence in specific ways; they may, in fact, work so as to counteract one another. We wish to avoid at present attempting to bind the entire set of hypotheses within a "tight" model. More meaningful, in our view, is the utilisation of data – to the extent to which they are available and have been analysed [13] – to test the hypotheses sequentially and to employ the results of this analysis to move in the direction of multivariate relationships. We attempt a step in this direction when explaining turnout in all countries and the party distribution of votes in one country (Denmark).

4. Testing the Hypotheses: A First Examination

4.1. "LESS-AT-STAKE"

As asserted in our hypothesis, the level of participation, in all nations except Luxembourg, is lower than in first-order elections (see Table V);

TABLE V

Difference in Turnout and Invalid Ballots (European Elections vs. Last National Elections)

	Difference in turnout (%)	Difference in invalid ballots as percentage of turnout	Date of last national election
Belgium	-2.4	+4.00	17.12.1978
Denmark	-41.9	-3.90	15.02.1977
Germany	-25.9	-0.23	3.10.1976
France	-22.0	+3.22	12.03.1978
Ireland	-12.5	+2.97	16.06.1977
Italy	-4.4	-0.74	3.06.1979
Luxembourg	+0.1	+2.78	10.06.1979
Netherlands	-29.1	+0.01	25.05.1977
United Kingdom	-43.0		3.05.1979

we will return to this single deviant case below. In addition to this exceptional case, the variance in the *degree* to which participation declined cannot be explained by the simple "less-at-stake" dimension.

Our hypothesis that government coalition parties would lose is confirmed in seven out of eight cases (see Table VI). The results in the United Kingdom and Italy show clearly that the election winners find a further, and larger, confirmation shortly after the first-order election. The Belgian and French figures can also be explained in terms of the

TABLE VI

National Government Parties Lose (Difference in Percent of Votes Cast for Governing Parties: European Elections and Last National Elections)

Country	Difference (%)
Belgium	-0.1 (1978); -0.9 (1977)
Denmark	-12.6 (1977)
Germany	-3.7 (1976)
France	-0.3 (1978) ^a
Ireland	-16.1 (1977)
Italy	-1.8 (1979, DC); -2.2 (1976, DC) ^b
Netherlands	+2.2 (1977)
United Kingdom	+4.5 (1979, Con) ^c

^a If JJSSs list is counted for opposition, the margin is -2.14.

^b If the parliamentary coalition of DC, PC, PSI, PSDI, and PRI is basis of calculation, the figures are -2.2 (1979) and -5.2 (1976).

^c Hypothesis corroborated, since theory predicts "overconfirmation" of last first-order election at second-order elections held shortly afterwards.

TABLE VII

Big Parties Lose ^a. (Difference in Percent of Votes Cast for Big Parties: European Elections and Last National Elections)

Country and parties	Difference (%)
Belgium: CVP/PSC, BSP/PS, PVV/PRLW	-0.6
Denmark: SD, FRP	-23.9
Germany: SPD, CDU/CSU	-1.2
France: PS, RPR, UDF, PC	-1.5
Ireland: FF, FG	-13.3
Italy: DC, PCI	-2.6
Luxembourg: PCS, POSL, PD	+5.8
Netherlands: CDA, PvdA, VVD	-1.2
United Kingdom: Con, Lab	-0.8

^a Parties with a share of votes higher than 15% in last national elections are considered as "big parties".

electoral cycle curve: the first-order elections are close enough to continue to have an influence; the popularity curve has not yet reached its lowest point. The exception here is the Netherlands, for the government parties did not lose.

In terms of the electoral cycle argument this would mean that the shift in voter preferences is "real" and should reflect itself also in the next first-order elections. First, however, it must be ascertained whether these results cannot be explained through our other hypotheses pertaining to the European elections. Luxembourg cannot be considered in this context, as the European elections were organised on the same day as national elections.

In eight of the nine member states the hypothesis is also confirmed that "big-parties-lose," i.e. that small and new parties have, indeed, better electoral prospects. The exception is Luxembourg (see Table VII), which can be explained largely through factors of the "European dimension". The particular success of the Ecologists, who are the "newest" of the political parties (exception: the Dutch PPR) and of the Danish People's Movement, underlines the confirmation of the hypothesis.

In only five of the eight nations for which we have figures on invalid ballots the hypothesis holds that the proportion of these would have increased (Table V). In the three nations in which these declined, voters faced a widened spectrum of political parties from which to choose, thus rendering this form of electoral protest in part superfluous. Voters in Denmark were "offered" the *Folkebevaegelsen*, in Germany *Die Grünen*, and in Italy the *Partito Radicale*.

4.2. EUROPE

We have maintained that voters who consider a given second-order political arena to be important will be more inclined to vote. This applies particularly in cases — such as that of the European elections — in which electoral participation in the “new” arena has the aspect of a referendum. Insofar as the pre-election declaration of the intention to vote and the post-election declaration of having voted can be used as an indication of actual electoral behaviour, this hypothesis appears to be confirmed in the case of two surveys. The pre-election survey-data analysis by Inglehart and Rabier (1979) and the post-election survey in France (Sofres/*Le Nouvel Observateur*, 1979) both lead to the conclusion that those more prepared to vote are those in favour of their nation’s membership in the EC (Table VIII).

The legitimacy of political parties in international politics is not as self-evident as in domestic politics. Data obtained in the EOS survey

TABLE VIII

Declared Intension of Electoral Participation by Assessment of Nation’s Membership in the EC (Percentages of those Declaring they would “Certainly go and Vote” — in the case of Germany, those “Probably” and “Certainly” — in Pre-Election Survey ^a; those Declaring they have Voted in Post-Election Survey ^b)

	Respondent feels membership of his country in EC is “A Good Thing”	Respondent feels membership of his country in EC is “A Bad Thing”
<i>Pre-election</i>		
“will certainly vote”	72	7
Others	38	21
DK	65	53
D	83	43
F	69	59
IRL	66	49
I	89	85
NL	66	50
UK	48	24
EC ^c	67	36
<i>Post-election</i>		
F	56	43

^a From Inglehart and Rabier, 1979.

^b Sofres/*Le Nouvel Observateur*, 1979.

^c Weighted according to population, with Belgium and Luxembourg excluded on account of compulsory voting.

TABLE IX

Party Legitimacy: Local, National, European Level (Percentages of those who Agree or Strongly Agree that Political Parties should play a Very Important Role at the Respective Level)

	B	DK	D	F	IRL	I	L	NL	GB	NIRL
Local	42.9	40.0	48.1	37.3	53.8	39.5	49.8	65.2	46.7	58.6
National	49.4	54.3	58.2	47.0	63.8	46.0	57.9	69.5	63.0	61.3
EC	42.1	33.3	50.0	42.3	58.2	41.9	52.5	63.5	45.2	48.2

tend to substantiate this (Table IX). We have argued that this fact has certain consequences for the level of electoral participation, and our respective hypothesis is confirmed in all nine countries. Those who believe that "political parties should play a very important role in EC-affairs" are more numerous among those who declare that they will certainly vote (Table X).

Regional parties are peripheral to the national central government of their country. European elections do not focus on the nation state. Table XI presents 18 parties (or categories of candidates) that stood only in a part of their country. Only 5 had a lower share of valid votes as compared to the last national legislative elections. All of these 5 losers lost votes to another regional party (and not to parties with a nation-wide organisation). All of those regional parties which were the only regional party in their regions had a better score at European elections, except the *Südtiroler Volkspartei* (I) which remained stable whereas the DC (I), to which the SVP is strongly associated nationally and transnationally, obtained a lower score.

The regional distribution of votes reveals the highly differentiated outcome for corresponding parties in the two Belgian constituencies (Table XII). In two *Länder* of West-Germany, local elections were held on the same day. This increased turnout significantly (Table XIII). The French Communists strongly stressed their opposition to the Spanish entry in the EC. In all south-western French regions, which are most affected by this perspective (as well as in Corsica, where the same is true), the PC obtained a higher proportion than in 1978. In all other regions the PC suffered a reduction in its share of the votes cast (except in Basse Normandie, where the PC also improved its position) (Table XIV). The results at the *Département*-level are somewhat more complex, however.

The Italian "Euro-regions" do not show dramatic deviations from the pattern at national elections (Table XV). The turnout in Scotland,

TABLE X
European Party Legitimacy and Intended Electoral Participation ^a

	DK		D		F		IRL		I		NL		GB		NIRL	
	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV
For parties	68	32	80	20	70	30	61	39	89	11	70	30	39	61	46	54
Against parties	49	51	68	32	60	40	51	49	83	17	48	52	32	68	33	67
Don't know/no answer	34	66	44	56	43	57	48	52	79	21	45	55	15	85	35	65
Totals	51	49	70	30	67	33	56	44	85	15	62	38	35	65	40	60

Source: Eurobarometer.

^a The calculation of "voters" and "nonvoters" is done according to the Inglehart/Rabier (1979) proposal: people indicating that they would "certainly go and vote" were classified as voters, except for the German sub-sample, where those indicating that they would "certainly" or "probably" go and vote were classified as voters. People under 18 are excluded from computation; missing cases (Don't know/No Answer) are classified as nonvoters. For Belgium and Luxembourg, where voting is compulsory, the question about voting intention was not asked.

The Party Legitimacy dimension is based on the question: "People hold different opinions on whether political parties should play a very important role in politics. What is your opinion with respect to the European community? How far are you in favour of or against political parties playing a very important role in the European community?" The answer-categories "strongly in favour" and "moderately in favour" are taken together as "For parties," the categories "neither . . . nor", "moderately against" and "strongly against" are taken together as "Against parties".

TABLE XI

Regional and Regionalist Parties (Percent of Votes in Region: Difference between European and National Elections)

Party	Difference (%)	Notes ^a
DUUR (NIRL)	+19.6	
Independents (IRL)	+8.7	++
SDLP (USE, NIRL)	+5.0	
CVP (EPP, BF)	+4.3	
Pl. Cymru (GBW)	+3.6	++
Ecol (BW)	+3.6	
PRL (ELD, BW)	+3.0	
CSU (EPP, DB)	+2.5	
FDF/RW (BW)	+2.2	+
SNP (GBS)	+2.1	++
Agalev (ecol., BF)	+2.0	
UV (I)	+0.4	++
SVP (EPP, I)	±0.0	++
VU (BF)	-2.0	+
PVV (BF)	-2.0	
PSC (EPP, BW)	-3.9	
PS (USE, BW)	-4.9	
OUUP (NIRL)	-14.7	

^a ++ = the only regional party of the region; + = the "regionalist" party in a region with other regional parties.

Wales and Northern Ireland was higher than in England (Table XVI).

In the three countries where membership of the EC or the future of Community institutions are highly debated (GB, DK, F) parties presenting a clearly positive or negative position did better than parties remaining ambiguous (Table XVII). The only exceptions are Danish Center Democrats and British Liberals (2 out of 19 parties). The same factor seems to contribute to the loss of the Dutch PvdA, which is internally split over EC matters, and the gain of the DUP of the Rev. Ian Paisley who fought the EC of the Rome treaties as a "Roman Catholic plot".

Of parties presenting prominent and popular candidates, particularly in countries where competing parties did not obtain better results (and vice versa), the clearest example was the British Labour Party. The success of the UDF and the relative success of the PCF might also – partially – be due to the fact that they presented prominent non-partisan candidates.

The role of transnational federations seems very much to have been of different weight. The hypothesis that national member parties would lose when bigger than, and win when smaller than their Eurofederation

TABLE XII
Regional Distribution of Votes and Seats per Party: Belgium

	Flemish constituency			Walloon constituency			Belgium				
	%EE	Diff. EE-NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE-NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE-NE	EP seats		
CVP	48.0	+4.3	7	PSC	21.2	-3.9	3	CVP/PSC	37.7	+1.4	10
BSP	20.9	+0.2	3	PS	27.4	-4.9	4	BSP/PS	23.4	-2.0	7
PVV	15.3	-2.0	2	PRL	17.7	+3.0	2	PVV/PRL	16.3	0	4
KPB	1.1	-0.8	-	PCB	5.0	-0.1	-	KPB/PCB	2.7	-0.6	-
VU	9.7	-2.0	1	FDF/RW	19.7	+2.2	2	FDF/RW	7.6	+0.6	2
Agalev	2.3	+2.0	-	Ecologists	5.1	+3.6	-	VU	5.9	-1.1	1
Other	2.3	-0.7	-	Other	3.5	-0.2	-	Ecologists	3.4	+2.7	-
								Other	2.6	-0.9	-

Turnout (valid votes): Flanders, EE 82.5%, NE 88.2%; Brussels, EE 75.7%, NE 84.9%; Wallonia EE 77.1%, NE 85.3%; Belgium as a whole, EE 80.0%, NE 86.9%. (Calculated from Fraeys, 1979).

TABLE XIII
Regional Distribution of Turnout and Votes and Seats per Party: Germany

Länder	Turnout (valid votes)		SPD		CDU/CSU ^b			FDP		Die Grünen ^c		
	%EE	%NE	%EE	Diff. EE - NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE - NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE - NE	EP ^a seats	%EE
Schleswig-Holstein	65.6	90.6	43.7	-2.7	1	47.9	+3.8	1	5.2	-3.6	1	2.7
Hamburg	66.4	91.1	52.2	-0.4	1	36.9	+1.0	1	6.3	-3.9	1	3.5
Lower Saxony	70.0	91.4	44.7	-1.0	5	45.8	+0.1	5	5.3	-2.6	5	3.6
Bremen	66.3	90.0	53.0	-1.0	-	32.7	+0.2	-	8.3	-3.5	-	4.7
Northrhine-West- phalia	67.4	91.3	44.6	-2.3	12	45.8	+1.3	12	5.8	-2.0	12	3.0
Hesse	66.5	91.9	45.4	-0.3	3	44.8	+0	3	6.2	-2.3	3	2.8
Rhineland-Palatinate ^d	78.1	91.5	41.1	-0.6	3	49.2	+0.7	3	6.4	-1.2	3	2.4
Baden-Württemberg	59.2	89.1	34.1	-2.5	6	52.3	+1.0	6	8.1	-1.0	6	4.5
Bavaria	58.9	89.6	29.2	-3.6	8	62.5	+2.5	8	4.7	-1.5	8	2.9
Saar ^d	81.1	92.9	44.0	-2.1	1	46.4	+0.2	1	5.8	-0.8	1	2.4
Federal Republic	65.7	90.7	40.8	-1.8	35 ^e	49.2	+0.8	42 ^f	6.0	-1.9	4	3.2

Source: Schwartz and Weber, 1979, p. 367.

^a CDU and CSU took part at the European Elections with Länder-lists; SPD, FDP and Die Grünen with nation-wide lists (Bundeslisten).

^b CSU figures for Bavaria, CDU-figures for all other Länder.

^c First nation-wide electoral participation of the ecologists Die Grünen.

^d In these Länder, local elections took place together with European Elections.

^e Including 1 MEP from Berlin.

^f Including 2 MEPs from Berlin.

TABLE XIV

Regional Distribution of Turnout and Votes per Party: France

Region	Turnout (valid votes)		PC		PS/MRG		UDF/UFE		RPR/DIFE	
	%EE	%NE	%EE	Diff. EE - NE	%EE	Diff. EE - NE	%EE	Diff. EE - NE	%EE	Diff. EE - NE
Nord	65.8	85.2	26.9	-0.7	26.0	-2.2	21.7	+9.7	13.2	-6.8
Picardie	64.8	85.3	26.6	-1.1	21.9	+0.1	23.2	+5.9	15.6	-7.4
Hte. Normandie	59.6	83.3	23.2	-2.8	23.7	+1.1	26.8	+6.9	13.6	-9.2
Bse. Normandie	55.8	82.3	12.4	+1.7	22.7	±0	32.1	-4.9	18.2	+0.8
Bretagne	58.9	83.7	14.7	-0.1	24.9	+0.1	32.7	+6.7	16.7	-7.3
Pays-de-la-Loire	56.1	82.5	11.7	-0.4	23.7	-0.8	34.0	+11.8	18.4	-12.0
Poitou-Charente	56.1	81.3	18.1	+1.0	26.0	-1.9	28.7	+5.7	16.5	-5.9
Aquitaine	60.0	82.8	20.0	+1.3	28.2	-2.5	24.3	+1.4	16.7	+0.7
Midi-Pyrénées	59.9	82.2	19.6	+1.7	29.9	-4.4	24.3	+8.6	15.7	-5.9
Languedoc	56.5	80.7	29.3	+1.6	23.6	-1.7	24.4	+5.0	13.0	-3.4
Provence-Côte d'Azur	55.9	79.8	26.2	-0.1	20.7	-0.1	27.6	+6.1	13.7	-5.7
Corse	46.0	69.4	18.8	+2.8	19.9	-9.1	22.5	+9.7	33.4	+0.1
Rhône-Alpes	53.5	79.5	18.6	±0	23.4	-1.7	31.2	+5.0	14.1	-2.7
Centre	58.0	82.0	20.0	-0.7	23.3	-0.6	28.9	+9.9	15.8	-7.0
Limousin	62.4	82.8	30.5	+0.2	21.5	-3.0	13.1	+8.6	26.8	-4.0
Auvergne	57.5	82.6	20.6	+1.4	24.3	-2.7	27.8	-0.4	17.0	-0.5
Bourgogne	57.1	81.4	18.0	-0.2	27.5	-2.0	26.7	+11.1	14.6	-7.9
Franche-Comté	56.6	82.7	14.7	-0.1	26.9	-3.9	29.3	+4.7	16.2	-0.2
Champagne	55.4	82.7	20.4	-2.4	22.3	-0.6	27.8	+6.1	17.2	-9.1
Lorraine	54.1	81.3	15.6	-1.2	24.2	-1.9	29.5	+1.2	15.1	-5.6
Alsace	53.2	79.7	6.2	-0.4	20.7	+0.6	38.1	+11.9	16.8	-16.8
Région Parisienne	58.4	79.8	22.9	-0.8	20.2	-0.4	25.7	+8.5	17.6	-6.2
France	57.5	81.8	20.5	-0.1	23.5	-1.2	27.6	+6.2	16.3	-6.3

Source: Gérard Le Gall, "Une nouvelle donne avant les présidentielles?" *Revue Politique et Parlementaire*, 81e année, No. 881, July-August 1979, p. 39; for turnout figures and UDF and RPR comparison between EE and NE, *Le Monde*, Les premières élections européennes (Juin 1979), Supplément aux dossiers et documents du *Monde*, pp. 81-108; for the final national results *Le Monde*, 24.10.1979.

in the EP, is clearly refuted among most Christian Democrats and many liberal parties. Of 13 Socialist Parties, 8 corroborate the hypothesis to varying degrees (Table XVIII). If we take only the hypothesis "nationally small parties in big Eurofederations win," Socialists and Christian Democrats with say 20% or less nationally, Liberals with 10% or less, then the hypothesis seems to hold better. Of 10 parties, 8 corroborate it, particularly all those 5 small Socialist parties which are members of the USE.

With respect to diffusion of a party's national identity through party federation membership more precise survey data analysis will have to be done. Perhaps an illustrative example is the Dutch VVD. This party is the one most to the right in the spectrum of the bigger Dutch parties. The ELD, on the other hand stresses its "centre" image. VVD lost 1.5%, but is a bigger governing party as well.

4.3. ELECTORAL PROCEDURES

Citizens in Belgium, Luxembourg and (in a less sanctioned way) Italy have legal obligation to go and vote, Ireland and two German *Länder* have held local elections, Luxembourg held general elections. If neither the first nor the second circumstance had been the case, the turnout at European elections in these countries would have been lower. From the electoral cycles argument it follows that national government parties' share of votes would – in this case – have been even lower. With respect to the 5% hurdle in France and Germany and the quorum in the smaller member states (4% in NL, 4.17% in B, 6.67% in DK without Greenland, 16.67% in L) one can assert that these regulations have not discouraged smaller parties from presenting candidates. In Denmark they have contributed to (but not caused) possible electoral alliances (KF, KrF, V, CD; DR; VS, SF, Fb), as they did in France (the prevention of MRG, CDS and all PRS presenting single lists, alliance among the two Trotskyist parties, alliance between MM. Malaud and Poujade, the attempt of an alliance between FN and PFN). In Germany, too, various ecologist parties and associations presented a common list for European elections and – a consequence which might decide the result of the 1980 *Bundestag* elections – in the meantime have decided to form a single party.

The change from the first-past-the-post-system to STV in Northern Ireland has enabled the catholic minority to be represented in the EP. The change from the two-ballot-absolute-majority to the PR system with one single constituency in France has considerably changed the style and structure of the campaign and has blurred the "equivalence

TABLE XV

Regional Distribution of Votes and Seats per Party: Italy

	North-West			North-East			Central		
	%EE	Diff. EE – NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE – NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE – NE	EP seats
DC	34.4	-2.2	8	36.7	-1.2	7	31.7	-2.3	5
PCI	28.7	-1.1	7	30.3	-1.0	5	36.4	-1.4	6
PSI	12.4	+1.4	3	10.8	+2.1	2	10.4	+1.3	1
MSI	3.3	-0.3	1	2.7	-0.3	—	5.5	-0.1	1
PSDI	4.7	+0.5	1	4.6	+0.6	1	4.0	+1.1	1
PR	4.1	-0.1	1	3.6	+0.2	1	3.7	+0.1	1
PLI	6.3	+3.0	2	3.7	+2.1	1	2.6	+2.1	—
PRI	3.0	-0.3	1	2.8	-0.5	—	2.9	-0.2	1
PDUP	1.1	-0.6	—	0.8	-0.4	—	1.6	+0.4	1
DP(NSU)	0.9	-0.1	1	0.5	-0.5	—	0.7	-0.1	—
SUP	—	—	—	2.8	+0	— ^a	—	—	—
UV	0.8	+0.5	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	—
DN	0.3	-0.3	—	0.2	-0.2	—	0.3	-0.1	—

Source: *Il Tempo*, 12.6.1979, p. 5; *Corriere D'Italia*, 17.6.1979, pp. 8, 9.^a One SVP candidate was selected on the DC list.

of measurement” between national legislative and European elections and – as Jean Luc Parodi (1979a) has shown well – has hidden the fact that much less has “really” changed than the result seems to indicate.

That the single constituency system used in Denmark (in contrast to national parliamentary elections) has fundamentally changed things – by reducing regional campaign efforts of parties – must be

TABLE XVI

Regional Distribution of Turnout, and Votes and Seats per Party: United Kingdom

	Turnout (valid votes)		Cons			Lab/SDLP			Lib		
	%EE	%NE	%EE	Diff.	EP seats	%EE	Diff.	EP seats	%EE	Diff.	EP seats
				EE – NE			EE – NE			EE – NE	
England	31.8	75.9	53.5	+6.3	54	32.5	-4.2	12	13.3	-1.6	—
Scotland	33.7	76.8	33.7	+2.3	5	33.0	-8.5	2	14.0	+5.3	—
Wales	34.4	79.4	36.6	+4.4	1	41.5	-5.4	3	9.6	-1.0	—
N-Ireland ^a	55.6	67.7	—	—	—	24.6	+4.9	1	—	—	—
UK	32.4	74.8	48.4	+4.5	60	32.6	-4.7	18	12.6	-1.2	—

^a First preference votes.

Calculated from Euro-Election Data, provided by Ian Gordon.

South			Isles			Italy		
%EE	Diff. EE – NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE – NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE – NE	EP seats
41.8	-1.4	7	40.6	-1.7	3	36.5	-1.8	29
25.7	-1.3	4	24.6	+0.9	2	29.6	-0.8	24
10.4	+0.4	2	10.3	+0.5	1	11.0	+1.2	9
9.4	+1.3	1	8.5	+0.9	1	5.4	+0.1	4
4.3	+0.6	1	3.5	-0.8	-	4.3	+0.5	4
2.8	+0.3	-	4.3	+1.2	-	3.7	+0.2	3
1.5	+0.3	-	2.6	+0.9	-	3.6	+1.7	3
1.5	-0.6	-	2.5	-0.9	-	2.6	-0.4	2
1.1	-0.2	-	1.0	-0.2	-	1.1	-0.3	1
0.7	+0.1	-	0.7	-0.1	-	0.7	-0.1	1
-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	+0	1
0.2	-	-	0.3	-	-	0.5	+0.4	-
0.6	-0.2	-	0.8	-0.5	-	0.4	-0.2	-

doubted. But it cannot be ruled out that permission of preference voting by the SD would have reduced the party's losses – and sent more “sceptical Europeans” to Strasbourg.

If DC and PCI on the one hand and the House of Commons opposition by toppling Callaghan so early, on the other, had not prevented European and first-order elections from taking place on the same day,

SNP/PC			DUP			OUUP		
%EE	Diff. EE – NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE – NE	EP seats	%EE	Diff. EE – NE	EP seats
19.4	+2.1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
11.7	+3.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	29.8	+19.6	1	21.9	-14.7	1
2.5	+0.5	1	1.3	+1.1	1	0.9	+0.1	1

TABLE XVII

Party Attitude towards European Unification (Definite Position vs. Ambivalence; Great Britain, Denmark and France only)

Ambivalent		Definite	
Party	Dif. EE - NE	Party ^a	Diff. EE - NE
SD (USE, DK)	-15.1	FB(-) (cd, DK)	+17.6
FRP (EDP, DK)	-8.8	UDF(+) (ELD/EPP, F)	+6.1
RPR (EDP, F)	-6.3	KF(+) (ED, DK)	+5.5
Lab (USE, GB)	-5.3	Con(+) (ED, GB)	+4.5
CFP (cd, DK)	-1.6	V(+) (ELD, DK)	+2.5
PS (USE, F)	-1.2	Ecol(+) (F)	+2.2
RV (ee, DK)	-0.3	VS() (DK)	+0.8
		SF(-) (Com, DK)	+0.8
		RF(-) (DK)	+0.1
		PCF(-) (Com, F)	-0.1
		CD(+) (ED, DK)	-0.2
		Lib(+) (ELD, GB)	-1.2
PvdA (USE, NL)	-3.4	DUUP (NIRL)	+19.6

^a + = pro-European, - = anti-European.

the British delegation to the EP certainly, and the Italian Chamber perhaps, would now look different. And the European elections' turnout would as well.

4.4. CAMPAIGN

For details on the campaigns the articles by Menke and Gordon, and by Lodge and Herman in this issue may be consulted (see also Reif, 1980a). Inglehart and Rabier (1979) show that awareness of campaign activities correlates with declared intention to go and vote. Only 4% of the declared non-voters in the Sofres/*Nouvel Observateur*-sample (post-electoral survey) justified their abstention by lack of sufficient information.

Michael Steed (1979) stressed the importance of British Conservatives' tactics not to heat up the campaign, because they presumed themselves to be better off with a relatively low turnout. This is perfectly in accordance with the electoral cycles argument. He has also emphasised the fact that because of the particular organisation of political journalism in Great Britain [14], the campaign was even less reported in the mass media, because the majority of political journalists went on holiday after the energy-consuming first-order elections. This

TABLE XVIII

Transnational Party Federations (European Size and National Size)

	USE (34% EP seats)			EPP (26% EP seats)			ELD (12% EP seats)				
	%NE	EE in % of NE	Index ^a	%NE	EE in % of NE	Index	%NE	EE in % of NE	Index		
SD, DK	37	59	+41	UDF, F	21	129	+29	PLI, I	2	189	+89
Lab, IRL	15	125	+25	DC, I	38	95	+5	PVV, B	17	88	+12
SDLP, NIRL	20	125	+25	SVP, I	3	100	+0	Lib, GB	14	91	+9
Lab, GB	37	86	+14	CDU, D	38	103	-3	VVD, NL	18	92	+8
PSDI, I	4	113	+13	CVP/PSC, B	39	104	-4	PVV/PRL, B	16	100	+0
PSI, I	10	112	+12	CSU, D	60	104	-4	PR, I	8	87	-13
SPD, D	43	96	+4	PCS, L	28	105	-5	PRL, B	15	120	-20
BSP, B	19	101	+1	FG, IRL	31	109	-9	V, DK	12	121	-21
PS, F	25	95	-5	CVP, B	43	110	-10	FDP, D	8	76	-24
BSP/PS, B	25	92	-8	CDA, NL	32	112	-12	UDF, F	21	129	+29
PvdA, NL	34	90	-10	PSC, B	25	84	-16	PD, L	23	132	-32
POSL, L	29	89	-11								
PS, B	32	85	-15								

^a Index indicates degree of growth, + = growth in predicted direction, - = growth in opposite direction.

occurred precisely during the period of the Euro-election campaign. In addition, the assessment of EC-elections' relevance by British TV-journalists went against an ample coverage of the campaign (cf. Blumler, 1979).

Certainly, the "information campaign on the government's EC policy," led by the French Prime Minister Raymond Barre, helped the UFE list of Mme. Veil more than other French lists. The fact that the PCF spent more money on the European elections campaign than in a comparable time-span before the 1978 National Assembly elections (personal interview, EES-campaign-project), speaks for itself.

4.5. MAIN-ARENA CHANGES

We have argued above that a full assessment of the electoral cycles versus politico-economical "real" change in voting preferences requires two first-order electoral results in addition to the respective second-order election results. Therefore we deal with this dimension for the Danish case only (see below).

Analysis of structural change requires long-term ecological data analysis which will be easier when the EUROVOTE files are available. We have ourselves carried out survey-data analysis of Eurobarometer 11 and other EOS data and we report a few of the results here.

In spite of fears expressed by Jacques-René Rabier (1976) on the basis of a series of Eurobarometer results, women's abstention rates do not seem to differ greatly from "normal," first-order election patterns (see Tables XIX and XX).

In contrast to Ronald Inglehart's (cf. his 1967) findings during the 1960s, today's younger generation is no longer the spearhead of combat for European unification (see Table XXI and XXII).

Workers declared before the elections less intention to go and vote, and after the elections less workers declared that they voted than members of other social classes (cf. Table XXIII). This corresponds to the Socialist parties' first-order electorates' relatively high rate of declared abstention (cf. Table XXIV).

4.6. ABSTENTIONS REVISITED

Almost all of our (less-at-stake, European, and campaign dimension) turnout-hypotheses predict low turnout. Together with the procedure-dimension aspects, they satisfactorily explain turnout in five countries. Four cases remain somewhat ambiguous: the particularly low turnout in Denmark and The Netherlands, and the particularly high turnout in

TABLE XIX
Sex and Intended Electoral Participation ^a

	DK		D		F		IRL		I		NL		UK: GB		UK: NIRL	
	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV
% Men	53	37	52	38	50	43	55	42	51	41	50	44	53	44	53	47
% V/NV	60	40	75	25	66	34	63	37	88	12	65	35	36	64	43	57
% Women	47	63	48	61	50	57	45	58	49	59	50	56	47	56	47	63
% V/NV	44	56	65	35	59	41	50	50	83	17	59	41	28	72	37	63
N	526	500	661	284	607	367	508	392	938	163	603	375	305	657	115	173
%	51	49	70	30	62	38	56	44	85	15	62	38	32	68	40	60

Source: Eurobarometer 11

^a For operationalization details of "intended electoral participation" see Table X.

TABLE XX
Sex and Party Preference

	Denmark ^a		France ^b		Germany ^c		Netherlands ^d				
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women			
Sex-distribution of voters in the sample	49	51	Sex-distribution of declared non-voters	45	55	Sex-distribution of those eligible to vote	46	54	Sex-distribution of voters in sample	48	52
AECA	49	51	of the Sofres sample			Sex-distribution of voters [§]	46	54	CDA	46	54
SD	51	49				SPD	47	53	PvdA	48	52
RV	49	51	Sex-distribution of declared voters of the Sofres sample	49	51	CDU	45	55	VVD	53	47
BEA	48	52				CDU	45	55	D'66	50	50
FRP	45	55				FDP	47	53			
			PC	47	53	Ecol	52	48			
			PS/MRG	52	48						
			UFE	43	57						
			DIFE	52	48						

^a Calculated from survey tables provided by de Borrie.

^b Figures from Sofres/*Le Nouvel Observateur*, pp. 22, 28.

^c Calculated from Weber (1979) Table I.

^d Calculated from INTOMART on election day.

TABLE XXI
Age and Intended Electoral Participation ^a

Age	DK		D		F		IRL		I		NL		GB		NIRL		
	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	
18-24	52	48	70	30	47	53	40	40	60	85	15	51	49	20	80	26	74
25-49	53	47	72	28	63	37	60	40	40	87	13	62	38	34	66	37	63
50 and over	49	51	68	32	68	32	60	40	40	83	17	65	35	34	66	50	50
N	526	500	661	284	607	367	508	392	938	938	163	603	375	305	657	115	173
%	51	49	70	30	62	38	56	44	85	15	62	38	62	38	62	40	60

Source: Eurobarometer 11.

^a For operationalization details of voting intention see Table X.

TABLE XXII
Age and Party Preference

Denmark ^a				France ^b			
7	18-24	25-54	55 and over		18-24	25-49	50 and over
Age-distribution of voters in sample	17	42	41	Age-distribution of declared non-voters of Sofres	24	47	29
AECA	28	47	25	Age-distribution of declared voters of Sofres sample	12	44	44
SD	9	33	58	PC	17	49	34
RV	15	46	39	PS/MRG	15	51	34
BEA	8	45	47	UFE	11	39	50
FRP	18	42	40	DIFE	13	43	44

^a Calculated from survey tables provided by Ole Borre.

^b Calculated from Sofres/*Le Nouvel Observateur*, pp. 22, 26, 28.

Northern Ireland. And the unique fact that turnout in Luxembourg was higher than in first-order elections.

The latter case might have something to do with the fact that first-order elections were held on the same day *and* Gaston Thorn's Parti Démocratique enjoyed so much more "European" than "national" support.

Sørensen (1979) attributed part of Denmark's low participation rate to what he called "information overkill" due to the intensive but very boring TV and radio campaign. This explanation could also be applicable in The Netherlands, where more than average information was provided by the media, government and EC-agencies. A curvilinear relationship between information about the EC and little-at-stake perception cannot be ruled out either: the more people know about European elections the more clearly they see just how little is at stake (cf. Menke and Gordon).

One must not forget, however, that the Dutch PvdA's Young Socialists led a very active campaign for abstention (cf. Lipschits, 1979), which might indeed help to explain low turnout, particularly among the younger voters, as well as the impressive losses of PvdA on the one hand, and D'66 gains on the other. The difference between Denmark and The Netherlands would, then, be due to the fact that the former is a more recent EC member (see Inglehart and Rabier, 1978, for the

Germany ^c	Netherlands ^d				Netherlands ^d		
	18-25	25-60	60 and over		18-24	25-49	50 and over
Age-distribution of those eligible to vote	13	61	26	Age-distribution of voters in the INTO-MART sample	16	46	38
Age-distribution of those voting	11	61	28	CDA	11	43	46
SPD	11	61	27	PvdA	15	45	40
CDU	8	61	31	VVD	15	49	35
CSU	9	59	32	D'66	28	54	18
FDP	12	65	23				
Ecol	36	56	8				

^c Calculated from Weber (1979), Tables 4, 8.

^d Calculated from INTOMART on election day.

time-series Eurobarometer-data on diffuse support for European integration).

This argument, however, makes it all the more difficult to explain the high turnout in Northern Ireland (where the difference is only 12.1%) which is an all-EC record, if we take legal requirements and other elections held on the same day into account. Michael Steed (1979) therefore spoke of “refutation of the support for European-integration hypothesis to explain turnout”: in the June 1975 UK referendum, 52% of those voting expressed hostility towards EC membership. If this is not so, generally, then for Northern Ireland it certainly holds true [15]. Steed’s convincing hypothesis hints at the fact – in line with our “regional” and “regionalist” argument – that the European election was the first election in the province since 1975 which did not refer to United Kingdom aspects generally.

The reduction of turnout in Belgium need not be attributed exclusively to “less-at-stake” directly, since the 18–20-year-olds voted for the first time nationally. The difference in turnout between the two electoral colleges in this country is due to the rather distinct party campaign strategies and styles (see Menke and Gordon in this issue).

The *Land* Baden-Württemberg in Germany provides clear evidence for the combined effects of “less-at-stake” and “new arena”. Administrative reform redefined cantonal borders a few years ago. The turnouts in

TABLE XXIII
Occupation of Head of Household and Intended Electoral Participation ^a

	DK		D		F		IRL		I		NL		GB	
	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV
Self-employed ^b	52	48	81	19	68	32	57	43	85	15	67	33	48	52
Employed ^c	55	45	71	29	59	41	56	44	87	13	60	40	30	70
Workers only	54	46	71	29	57	43	55	45	87	13	57	43	28	72
Not employed ^d	43	57	62	38	68	32	56	44	81	19	64	36	29	71
N	524	494	659	282	600	364	490	377	938	163	556	375	305	656
%	51	49	70	30	62	38	57	43	85	15	62	38	32	68

Source: Eurobarometer 11.

^a For operationalization details of "intended electoral participation" see Table X.

^b Including farmers, fishermen, professionals — lawyers, accountants; businessmen — owners of shops, craftsmen.

^c Including manual workers, white-collar workers, executives, top-management.

^d Including retired, housewives, students, military servicemen, unemployed.

TABLE XXIV

Last National Party Vote and Intended Electoral Participation ^a

	DK		D		F		I		NL		GB	
	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV	V	NV
Communists					75	25	89	11				
Socialists	51	49	79	21	69	31	89	11	64	36	31	69
Liberals	56	44	74	26	77	23	88	12	77	23	35	65
Christian Democrats			72	28			88	12	63	37		
Conservatives											42	58
Democrats for Progress	41	59			79	21						
Whole electorate	51	49	70	30	62	38	85	15	62	38	32	68

^a Calculated only for those party-electorates which come close to the size of one hundred people or more in the Eurobarometer sample. For operationalization details of "intended electoral participation" see Table X.

Baden-Württemberg in recent elections of all sorts were as follows: local, 1975, 68%; Landtag, 1976, 75%; Bundestag, Oct. 1976, 89%; European, June 1979, 59%; and "new" cantonal, Oct. 1979, 55%.

4.7. DENMARK: ELECTORAL CYCLE COMPLETED

On October 23, 1979, national Parliament elections took place. Thus we have for one country important additional information with which to place the result of direct elections to the EP in proper perspective, i.e. between two first-order elections. In this perspective, the electoral cycles argument of our less-at-stake dimension is well illustrated if we look at the October results of the Social Democrats, who had lost 41% of their share of votes in June. In Table XXV, we have listed the Danish parties in the rank order of their gains and losses in June 1979 as compared to their 1977 scores. In addition, we indicated the predictions following from the electoral cycles hypothesis of our less-at-stake dimension, then the prediction from the hypothesis on clear or ambiguous party positions on EC-matters of our European dimension, then the main-arena political trend, the "real" (first-order) changes in party preference as measured by the October results, and, finally, a crude indicator of long-term trend in the party system summarising the last five first-order electoral results as ascending, descending or stable. The last column gives the gains and losses of October 1979 as compared to 1977.

TABLE XXV

Denmark

	% of votes 2/77	% of votes 6/79	% of votes 10/79	Gains EE (% of 77)	Govt. hyp.	Clear E-stand hyp.	Short trend	Long trend	Gains NE (% of 77)
Fb	—	21.0	—	max.	+	+			
KF	8.5	14.0	12.5	+65	+	+	+	+	+47
VS	2.7	3.5	3.6	+30	+	+	+	+	+33
SF	3.9	4.7	5.9	+21	+	+	+	+	+33
V	12.0	14.5	12.5	+21	—	+	0	0	+4
DR	3.3	3.4	2.6	+3	+	+	—	0	—21
CD	6.4	6.2	3.2	—3	+	+	—	—	—50
RV	3.6	3.3	5.4	—8	+	—	+	0	+50
S	37.0	21.9	38.3	—41	—	—	0	+	+3
KrF	3.4	1.8	2.6	—47	+	—	—	—	—23
FRP	14.6	5.8	11.0	—60	+	—	—	—	—25
DKP	3.7		1.9		+	+	—	—	—51

+ = prospective gain, — = prospective loss, 0 = indifferent.

From this table we see that the party stand on EC matters discriminates best. Second is main-arena political change. The government-opposition-hypothesis is somewhat blurred for *Venstre* (as compared to *Retsforbund* and Center Democrats), probably because *Venstre* was the crystallising pole on the pro-European side against the *Folkebevaegelsen* on the other. Still, the additional advantage of the *Konservative Folkeparti* as national opposition party is clearly visible in the quantitative proportion of gains. Neither the big/small-party hypothesis nor one of our hypotheses based on transnational party federations contribute, except perhaps in explaining the difference between Left Socialists (VS) and People's Socialists (FS), the latter having had a MEP (Communist group), or with respect to CD and RV, with the same argument.

5. Appendix

5.1. METHODS AND DATA

Empirical electoral research makes use of three types of methods of analysis: analysis of aggregate data, of public opinion surveys, and comparisons of electoral results. Testing our framework we employ various types of analysis depending upon the particular factor or factors in question. Our approach rests upon examination of the European elections as national second-order elections, and seeks to explain the partisan distribution of votes and seats through the influence of five

groups of factors: "less-at-stake," specific-arena circumstances, electoral procedure, campaign, main arena changes.

The problem of ecological fallacy accompanies aggregate data analysis. In particular for the theory of second-order elections it is important not to lose sight of disadvantages in the use of survey methods. Pre-election surveys conducted more than two weeks prior to elections tend to over-weight the support of the (national) opposition, for many floating voters make their final decision only shortly before the election (Kaase, 1967). Surveys among *voters* on election day give only indirect information as to non-voters; however non-voting and differential turnout figures are especially important aspects of results in second-order elections. Surveys after the election tend to over-weight the voter strength of the electoral victor. All surveys suffer under the problematic nature of the relationship between attitudes and actual behaviour – particularly in the case of standardised survey instruments.

The results of the European elections were by-and-large finalised by October 1979. After the decision of the Conseil d'Etat concerning the French outcome, the only final figures not officially issued were those from Greenland. Their availability for social scientists and the general public, however, remains problematic. In the publication of the European Parliament as of October one still finds lacunae and errors. The figures which we present here have been gleaned from various sources; we are grateful for the assistance of the various participating scholars of the European Elections Study and to a number of EC-member embassies in Bonn in helping to accumulate these data.

Three EC-wide public opinion surveys were carried out. The "European Omnibus Survey" conducted a pre-election sampling in April 1979 including the "Eurobarometer 11" as well as questions by a number of research bodies, such as the EES. The data used here on party-legitimacy, sex, and age, have been drawn from the EOS project. Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-René Rabier (1979) analysed the "Eurobarometer 11" data regarding declared intention to vote; the present authors make use of these findings when dealing with pro-European attitudes and turnout. The second survey was an EC-wide pre-election poll in May 1979 under the auspices of nine national newspapers. The third survey was conducted after the elections by the transnationally organised "Project for the Study of the Role of Broadcasting in the first direct elections to the European Parliament," directed by Jay G. Blumler under the auspices of the International Institute for Communications, London. The data of this project were collected in June, mostly by the same institutes that participated in the EOS survey (Luxembourg was not included). Analyses of these data should be available by the end of January 1980 (cf. Blumler et al., 1980). So far we have only the French results of this project; these were collected by Sofres (financed by *Nouvel Observateur*) and the results were published on 23 July 1979 (Julliard, 1979).

A Dutch television service carried out a survey on election day and broadcast its results. We draw data on sex and age from this survey. Ole Borre, Jørgen Elklit, and Ole Jonsgaard collected data on election day in four Danish election wards ($N = 4876$). The report, the results of this study and of an analysis of certain aggregate data (1979) were kindly put at our disposal. From this survey we also obtain information on sex and age. The West German Office of Statistics investigates for all national parliamentary elections a representative sample of voters from selected polling stations. Its results have been published for the European elections (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1979); and we used its data on sex, age, region, and

party. Additional German data came to us from INFAS, Bad Godesberg (1979) and Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V. (1979), both of which institutes present analyses of aggregate and survey data on German elections. Constituency results from the United Kingdom were put at our disposal by the EES National Director there, Ian Gordon, Kingston. From Gérard Le Gall's article (1979) on French regional results we take information on the PS and the PCF; we ourselves calculated corresponding data on the RPR and UDF. For the kind assistance in obtaining regional Italian data we thank EES National Project Director, Giovanna Zincone, for the Dutch, Isaac Lipschits; and for the Belgian, Nicole Loeb and Paul Claeys, respective National EES Project Directors. We took the Danish data from the EES "Campaign Analysis Report" on Denmark, very extensively prepared by Carsten L. Sørensen (1979).

Jean-Luc Parodi (1979a) has published an impressive analysis of the French election results. His presentation at Königstein (1979b) has strengthened our belief that secular trends in certain structural factors must be considered in explanations of the results of the European elections. From Michael Steed's presentation at Königstein (1979) we obtained the detailed results for Northern Ireland; his presentation also served to alert us to the importance of the "lobby club" system in media reports on the European election campaign in GB. Earlier interpretation of the results of the European elections have been published by Rudolf Hrbek (July, 1979), Roger Morgan (July, August, 1979), Alain Lancelot (September, October, 1979), and François G. Dreyfus (September, 1979).

Notes

- 1 He obtained the largest number of preference votes in his country. His party had 6.8% increase in share of votes at the European as compared to the national elections. This is the highest gain of all ELD parties. Being the president of the ELD, he planned to present his candidature for the presidency of the EP, but renounced this when the ELD parliamentary group, by a narrow vote, decided to support Simone Veil. She had led the UFE-list to a 6.1% victory but was not a member of an ELD party. Her candidature was made possible by an alliance of the UFE-MEP's and ELD vice-president Martin Bangemann (FDP, D) who was repaid with the presidency of the ELD parliamentary group. This division within the liberal group proved very harmful to the liberal party federation (cf. Reif, 1979).
- 2 Even though all observers were clear as to the political impact which the elections should have, not only in Ireland and The Netherlands, but also in France, President Giscard d'Estaing never tired of stressing that these elections had nothing to do with domestic politics in France.
- 3 This holds true insofar as elections determine the allocation of political power; one is referred in this regard to the literature on "administrative government," "corporatism," "state-monopolistic capitalism," and the "symbolic uses of politics".
- 4 In France, presidential elections are the most decisive elections. They are the first-order elections. Whether National Assembly elections are second-order or first-order, too, may be controversial, due to the institutional construction of the Fifth Republic. We refer to the last National Assembly elections as first-order elections in this paper. For a detailed discussion see Reif (1981).

- 5 For a discussion of possible consequences of second-order elections for the chief arena of a political system, see Reif (1978).
- 6 Relevant literature includes that in the following areas: electoral cycles of governmental party popularity (Dinkel, 1977a; Stimson, 1976; Miller and Mackie, 1973, on West-Germany, the U.S.A. and the U.K.); mid-term congressional elections in the United States (Tuftte, 1975); the inter-relationships between regional elections and national politics in West Germany (Fabritius, 1978; Dinkel, 1977b; Kaack, 1974). We shall make additional use here of more general theories, in particular certain concepts and propositions on: electoral non-participation (Lancelot, 1968), floating voters (Kaase, 1967), Hirschman's *exit, voice and loyalty* (1970); party identification (Budge et al., 1976; Campbell et al., 1960; 1966); and electoral systems (Duverger, 1950; Rae, 1967; Wildenmann et al., 1965).
- 7 cf. the EES-project on "European Political Parties' Middle Level Elites".
- 8 cf. the EES candidates' survey.
- 9 cf. the project on "The role of Broadcasting in the First Direct Elections of the European Parliament," directed by Jay G. Blumler et al.
- 10 cf. the project on "The Structure and Activities of the Main Interest Groups and their Relations with the European Level Interest Groups", directed by Emil Kirchner und Rudolf Hrbek.
- 11 Parties originally hostile to the direct election, like the PCF (F) or the RPR (F) did not come out against participation in order to prevent domestic disadvantages. Many small Dutch parties put up candidates although they had not the slightest chance of winning a seat, for the same reasons. The DKP (DK) who did not present a list against the *Folkebevaegelsen mod EF* (but obtained one EP seat on this list) suffered a reduction of 51% of its electorate at the subsequent as compared to the last national election.
- 12 Such a project is being prepared by the "Research Group on the Party Systems of the EC," Mannheim.
- 13 This article was written in October, 1979.
- 14 Most political journalists in Britain are members of the "Lobby Club" (referring to the Lobby of Westminster). This membership extends to them a number of privileges in the House of Commons and their main source of information on British politics is members of Parliament. These – after first-elections and forming a government – were more interested in things other than European elections.
- 15 Inglehart and Rabier (1979) do not report on Northern Ireland, although there was, as always, a particular Northern Ireland sample in the Eurobarometer 11. Neither does the official Eurobarometer-11-Report.

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